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ABSTRACT

Death of the Caliphate: Reconfiguring Ali Abd al-Raziq’s ideas and legacy
by
Arooj Alam
Advisor: Professor Samira Haj

The demise of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 generated vigorous debates throughout the
Muslim world regarding the political future of the Ummah. While several prominent Muslim
thinkers contributed to this “Caliphate debate,” none left as contested a legacy as the Egyptian
intellectual, ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq (1888-1966). In his scholarly publication, Islam and Foundations
of Governance, Abd al-Raziq argued against the revival and resurrection of the Caliphate by
redefining it as coercive, monarchal, and as the antithesis of the community first established by
Prophet Muhammad. While Abd al-Raziq’s book attracted tremendous criticisms in 1925,
numerous scholars today have commended and hailed him as the father of Secularism,
Liberalism, and Laicism. This thesis, however strongly rejects such labels by investigating how
Abd al-Raziq imbued the Caliphate with a modern definition and relied upon authoritative
evidence from the Islamic tradition to bolster his analyses. By situating his criticisms within the
Islamic tradition, this thesis demands that we reconfigure Abd al-Raziq’s ideas and legacy,
without the aid of limiting and misleading Western-centric categories. Additionally, by making
use of Urdu language primary sources, this thesis brings forth reception of South Asian Muslims
on Abd al-Raziq’s work, to emphasize cross-cultural debates and disagreements amongst
Muslims on the significance of the Caliphate, which continue to persist today.
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I. Introduction
The term “Caliphate” is deployed frequently by both the Western and Muslim media,
thus emboldening certain Islamic extremist groups, such as the Islamic State, to appropriate this
concept for their political discourses worldwide.1 However, before the hijacking of this concept,
Muslims debated, discussed, and disagreed amongst themselves over the significance of this term
throughout history. Medieval and pre-modern Muslims theorized various blue prints for
sustaining an ideal Caliphate, which would emulate the time of Prophet Muhammad and his
immediate successors, the Rightly Guided Caliphs (Khulafa al-Rashidun).2 The term Caliphate
was thus molded and remolded by various Muslims throughout history, since it did not have a
single definition within the authoritative texts of the Holy Quran and Prophetic Sunnah (hadith).
Interestingly, the word Caliphate (al-Khilafa) meaning the political institution overseen
by a person in charge, emerged out of the word “Caliph” (Khalifa), and its plural (Khulafā), as
mentioned in the Quran.3 The Quran offers multiple definitions for the word Khalifa; the primary
definition referring to a “successor, substitute, replacement, or deputy” or a group of people,
“replaced” by Allah, with another morally steadfast community.4 The second definition of
Khalifa implies one who “settles on earth”; it appears throughout the Adam verses in the Quran
Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants,” The Atlantic, March 2015,
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/. Hassan Hassan,
“The Sectarianism of the Islamic State: Ideological Roots and Political Context,” Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, June 13, 2016, https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/13/sectarianism-ofislamic-state-ideological-roots-and-political-context-pub-63746.
2
After this first time, all mentions of the Rightly Guided Caliphs will be abbreviated as merely the
Rashidun. For more information on modern and medieval Islamic political theory see L. Carl Brown, “16Islamic Political Thought,” in The New Cambridge History of Islam Volume 6: Muslims and Modernity:
Culture and Society since 1800, ed. Robert W. Hefner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010),
385-410. Also, Han Hsien Liew, “Writing Away the Caliph: Political and Religious Legitimacy in Late
Medieval Islamic Political Thought” (MA Thesis, Wesleyan University, 2012).
3
Wadad Kadi, “Caliph,” in Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān, ed. Jane Dammen McAuliffe (Leiden, 2001-6),
277.
4
Ibid.
1
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when Allah informs his angels, “Indeed, I will make upon the earth a successive authority”
(which refers specifically to Adam) but is applicable to all of the humankind according to some
Quranic interpreters.5 According to Wadad Kadi, the third, and rarer political definition - as
someone who possess authority to govern - appears only in the David verses of the Quran when
Allah proclaims, “O David we have made you a Khalīfa on earth; so judge justly between people
and follow not desires lest they should thwart you from God’s path.”6 These various definitions,
contexts, and occurrences of the term Khalifa in the Quran puzzled Quranic exegetes
(Mufasirun) endlessly.
Signifcant for my thesis is the fact that pre-modern exegetes did not rely upon the
political definition of Khalifa until the advent of the Persian polymath, al-Tabarī (d. 310/923).7
Al-Tabari was responsible for standardizing the political definition of Khalifa, by combining
“the Qurānic Khalīfa with the head of the Islamic community” within Sunni political thought,
under the Abbasid caliphs.8 Whereas historically Muhammad's immediate successors had
differentiated their authority as Caliphs from the Prophet’s (which consisted of messenger-ship),
by coining the title Khalīfat Rasūl Allāh (successor of the messenger of God), and not Khalīfat
Allāh (vicegerent of God).9 Both Kadi and Han Hsien Liew’s work emphasize that historically
Rashidun had not combined political and religious authority, thus challenging works of some

5

Quran, 38:26, The Noble Quran, https://quran.com/38/26.
Kadi, “Caliph,” 277.
7
Han Hsien Liew, “The Caliphate of Adam: Theological Politics of the Qurʾānic Term Ḫalīfa,” Arabica
63, (2016):1-29, https://doi 10.1163/15700585-12341381. In the footnotes, Liew writes, "Up till the end
of the fourth/tenth century, the word sulṭān was understood in the sense of governmental power or of the
person who at a particular time is the personification of impersonal governmental power. The latter
meaning is found for the caliphs as early as the caliph al-Manṣūr (d. 158/775) who referred to himself as
sulṭān Allāh fī arḍihi (Sultan on Allah’s earth).”
8
Kadi, “Caliph,” 278.
9
Ibid.
6
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Orientalists who maintain that religious, legislative, and political authority all were initially
vested under the Caliph’s title.10 The ambiguity of the term Khalifa in the Quran clearly shows
that there was no agreement amongst pre-modern Muslims, over the meaning of this concept,
from the death of the Prophet until the 10th century.
Since the Caliphate as a category has a history its meaning, and how that meaning
changed over time, both have to be explained historically. How that meaning gets to be
transcribed into practice is bound to be different from one period to another, and as such, it does
not have an immutable essence. Additionally, the Caliphate which emerged at the time of the
Rashidun was very different from the one which was established under various dynasties, since
“the institution of the Caliphate developed gradually with time and crystallized only at the
beginning of the Abbasid period in the second half of the eighth century.”11 Thus, when we refer
to the Caliphate or a Caliph, it is not in the same sense as what had existed in the past, since our
conception of the past and conditions of the present are vastly different.
Overall, the debates over the nature of the Caliphate in modern times are bound to be
different from those of earlier times; while Muslims attempt to locate new meanings within the
Islamic tradition, such meanings are necessarily shaped by the conditions dictated by modernity.
Living under the project of modernity, neither Muslims nor non-Muslims can ever revive the
past; they can only re-imagine it as it unfolds within language, history, and different
temporalities. As the German conceptual historian, Reinhart Koselleck, has elucidated, concepts
have multilayered and overlapping temporalities. Thus a conceptual history brings forth a history
Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds, God’s Caliph: Religious Authority in the First Centuries of Islam,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
11
Wadad Kadi, “Caliph,” in The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought, eds. Gerhard
Bowering, Patricia Crone, Wadad Kadi, Devin J. Stewart, Muhammad Qasim Zaman, and Mahan Mirza
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 81.
10
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which is alive, active, and which cannot be fitted into categories of beginnings, ends, transitions,
ruptures, and brakes.12 Similarly the concept of a pristine Caliphate, to which modern Muslims
frequently refer, did not emerge until the Sunni tradition elevated the status of the four Caliphs
(Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, Ali) with Prophet Muhammad’s hadith, which stated that “Khilāfa
(Caliphate) after me will be thirty years; after that, it will be kingship.”13
Some Western and Muslims scholars would argue that “above all, a Caliph was Muslims’
religious leader who ensured the obedience of the community to the divine law (Sharia).”14
However, I contend, the seemingly “religious” activities performed by the Rashidun were
symbolic functions assigned out of deference for their positions as political leaders. Additionally,
we need to consider the tribal structure of the Rashidun’s community, which was far more
egalitarian, less centrally organized, and based on kinship, to reach the conclusions of Kadi.15 It
is no accident that the succession conflict over Uthman and Ali’s authority after the death of the
second Caliph, Umar, emerged due to the lack of consensus in consultation among the tribal
community.
Consultation (al-Shura) during the time of the Rashidun included leading members from
the community, who came together to pledge allegiance to the most qualified person for the title
of the Caliph. This principle of shura, as mentioned in the Quran was central for early Muslims
since it determined the Caliph’s authority—both moral and political. Members of the majlis alshura (those gathered to consult) measured a candidate's qualifications (for the Caliphate) based
upon his wisdom and morality, similar to the traits exhibited by Prophet Muhammad. However,
Jordheim Helge, “Against Periodization: Koselleck’s Theory of Multiple Temporalities,” History and
Theory, no. 2 (2012):151–171, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2303.2012.00619.x.
13
Kadi, “Caliph” in The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought, 84.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
12
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these members did not consider the Caliphs would supersede the role of the Prophet as the final
messenger of God. It might be tempting then to posit here the categories of “religious” and
“political” to differentiate prophetic authority from that of the Rashidun. However, we must
remember that even the binaries of “religious” and “political” authority did not exist in the
lexicon of the Arab tribes then. There was no language available then to delineate these different
meanings. Instead, it is helpful to think of prophetic authority as being concerned with
transforming the ethical sensibilities of believers, whereas Caliphal and Rashidun’s authority
concerned itself with leading the believers in a world without prophecy.16
The Egyptian intellectual, Sharia court judge, and Islamic reformer, Ali Abd al-Raziq,
similarly differentiated prophetic authority from Caliphal authority in his book al-Islam wa-usulal-hum (Islam and the Foundations of Governance). In it, he argued that the nature of political
sovereignty in Islam was different from “religious” authority. This understanding of Islamic
history and the Rashidun Caliphate cost Abd al-Raziq dearly, as he lost his judgeship license,
and attracted tremendous criticisms throughout the Muslim world in 1925. My primary purpose
here is to understand, how Abd al-Raziq attempted to legitimize the historic separation of powers
by locating his argument within the Islamic tradition and Islamic history. Also, I explore Muslim
responses and reactions to Abd al-Raziq's book, especially those living in modern day India and
Pakistan.
This thesis offers a way for present day Muslims and Western scholars to read, interpret,
and come to terms with Abd al-Raziq’s ideas and legacy, as well as the nature of political and
religious authority in Islam. As David Scott reminds us, “morally and politically what ought to
Due to a lack of adequate substitutes, I will continue to employ the categories of “Religious” and
“Political” authority throughout this thesis. However, I hope that the readers will consider the
shortcomings of these terms and the specific historicity of these categories.
16
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be at stake in historical inquiry is a critical appraisal of the present itself, not the mere
reconstruction of the past.”17 Hence my thesis poses the dilemma of how Muslims can reconcile
the contradictions posited by modern state structures and their institutions with Islam as a living
tradition? Solving this dilemma has real-world implications, since redefining the nature of
sovereignty and religious authority in Islam can alter how we moderns reimagine Islam. A
religion, which is not a monolithic, static, and irrational system of “belief” but a dynamic,
diverse, and living entity.
This thesis is divided into the following sections; Section 1 presents a brief history of
secularization and the nature of political sovereignty in Turkey and Egypt during the early 1920s.
It is against this backdrop, I argue, that Abd al-Raziq made specific arguments against the
possibility of a renewal of the Caliphate. Section 2 explores the reception of Abd al-Raziq’s
ideas by both Muslim and Western scholars. In this section, I challenge specific Western-centric
labels by situating his work within the Islamic tradition. Lastly, Section 3 traces the broad crosscultural connections between the Middle East and South Asia and more specifically between
Egypt, India, and Pakistan, with a focus on primary Urdu sources. I select South Asian Muslims
and their critique of Abd al-Raziq’s work to bridge a glaring gap in scholarship as well as to
highlight how Muslims have continually debated the significance of the Caliphate throughout
history.

*****
In 1924, the Turkish Grand National Assembly's decision to abolish the Ottoman
Caliphate triggered intense debates throughout the Muslim world. Disagreements abounded

17

David Scott, Conscripts of Modernity (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004), 41.
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among Muslims from Egypt to India, on how to proceed in the aftermath of this occurrence. The
responses ranged between the two positions of either reinstating the Caliphate or moving on from
this institution; these different positions later came to be identified as the “Caliphate debate.”
History shows, there were never any clear winners within this debate, but several losers, such as
the Ottoman Caliph Abdulmecid II, and the Egyptian reformer Ali Abd al-Raziq. It has taken 80
years after Abd al-Raziq’s death for Muslims and non-Muslims to revisit his ideas on the
Caliphate and hail him as the father of Islamic liberalism, secularism, and laicism.18 However,
this revision of his ideas and legacy have not only oversimplified Abd al-Raziq’s views but have
also overlooked his commitments to Islam. Since he was first a Muslim judge, who eventually
published his research in 1925, his views regarding Islam should be front and center when
discussing his critique of the Caliphate as mentioned in his book, al-Islam-wa-usul-al-hukm
(Islam and the Foundations of Governance).19
Abd al-Raziq's primary critique of the Caliphate was that this concept was not a
“religious” obligation within the Islamic tradition but merely a necessity for a specific period. No
doubt, this provocative and bold argument should be re-examined more closely. In this section, I
proceed to do precisely that by first providing a brief background to the conflict over the nature
of the Caliphate engendered by the modernizing project during the Ottoman Empire and
On the labels of “liberalism," “secularism” and “laicism” with regards to Abd al-Raziq’s work consult:
Leonard Binder, Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies, (University of Chicago Press,
1989). David Sagiv, “Chapter 7: Attitudes to the Caliphate and the Imamate” in Fundamentalism and
Intellectuals in Egypt 1973-1993, (Routledge, 1995). Luay Radhan, Muslims against the Islamic State:
Arab Critics and Supporters of Ali Abdarraziq's Islamic Laicism, (Ph.D. diss., Peter Lang Academic
Research, 2014).
19
According to Charles Butterworth, a more appropriate translation for the title would be Islam and the
roots of governance instead of; fundamentals of government, sources of political authority, bases of
power, or foundations of political power. “Law and the Common Good; To bring about a virtuous city or
preserve the old order,” in The Mirror for the Muslim Prince: Islam and theory of Statecraft, ed. Mehrzad
Boroujerd (Syracuse University Press, 2013), 218.
18
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immediately after its collapse in the aftermath of World War I. My focus here is primarily on
Egypt and Turkey, where the question of the Caliphate as combining religious and political
authority was hotly debated. Secondly, I discuss the details of Abd al-Raziq’s critique against the
Caliphate in his book al-Islam, which argues that the Caliphate historically was a political
institution rather than “religious” in nature. He does that by making both a historical as well as a
“religious” argument and by providing evidence from within the Islamic tradition to bolster his
claims.

*****
The modernizing project of the Ottoman Empire took place under what is known today as
the Tanzimat system lasting between 1839-1876. Ottoman Bureaucrats pushed for reforms to
combat the aggression of external Western enemies, as well as to control the wave of nationalist
uprisings within the Empire. The Tanzimat system continued under the reign of Sultan, and selfappointed Caliph, Abdulhamid II (1842-1918), hence heralding the Hamidian regime of power.
Abdulhamid II’s regime generated stronger calls for popular sovereignty and the demand for a
constitution to limit his political power - since he had re-molded the category of the Caliphate to
having a “pious” meaning by combining both religious and political authority under this title.
Most importantly, he imbued the title of the Caliph with new meanings, as he created new
traditions and ceremonies in his honor and rewarded those loyal to him, thus departing from the
practices and conduct of the Rashidun.
As Sukri Hanioglu explains, the calls for a constitution within the Empire first emerged
in 1826 when Ottoman bureaucrats monopolized power at the expense of other political groups.
It was then hoped that the Constitution would allow Muslim masses’ public opinion to lead the
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government, thus the emergence of their concept of popular sovereignty.20 By Sultan
Abdulhamid II's time, Ottoman bureaucrats joined forces with their critics in re-demanding the
Constitution, which they hoped, would curb the ambitions of the Sultan. Abdulhamid II, like “his
predecessors, the Tanzimat statesmen” however, imposed strict adherence to the letter of the law,
while also presenting himself as a “just” Islamic Caliph.21
After the collapse of the Empire in the aftermath of World War I, Mustafa Kemal
(d.1938) came to a head the new nation-state of Turkey, and under his leadership, the contest
between state sovereignty and popular sovereignty resumed once more, albeit under different
historical conditions. Give the title (Ataturk) or father of the secular Turkish nation-state, Kemal
is best remembered as having encouraged the ideal of popular sovereignty, while historically he
consolidated his power under this guise.22 First, he ended the Sultanate, and eventually the
Caliphate in 1924, as part of his aggressive policy of secularizing and modernizing Turkey a la
Europe. His abolishment of the Caliphate generated different reactions; those like the “two
members of the Indian Khilafat Movement, Maulana Mohammad Ali and Shaukat Ali, urged
Kemal to preserve the Ottoman Caliphate for the sake of Islam.”23 However, as Basher Nafi
points out:
“Under Turkey's new nationalist government, (Khilafat Movement’s requests) however, was
construed as foreign intervention, and any form of foreign intervention was labeled an insult to Turkish

Şükrü Hanioğlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2008), 112.
21
Ibid, 123.
22
Basheer M. Nafi, “The Abolition of the Caliphate in Historical Context,” in Demystifying the
Caliphate: Historical Memory and Contemporary Contexts, ed. by Malawi Al-Rasheed, Carool Kersten,
and Marat Shterin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 31. See also; Serif Mardin. “Religion and
Secularism in Turkey” in The Modern Middle East: A Reader, eds. Albert Hourani, Philip S. Khoury, and
Mary C. Wilson (University of California Press, 1993), 347–74.
23
Basheer M. Nafi, “The Abolition of the Caliphate in Historical Context,” 33.
20
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sovereignty, and worse, a threat to State security. Kemal promptly seized his chance…on his initiative;
the National Assembly abolished the Caliphate on February 20, 1924.”24

By the 1920’s a contest over sovereignty also ensued between the Egyptian King Fuad I
(1868-1936), and the Egyptian political elite parties and intellectuals who aspired for popular
sovereignty. In her book A Short History of Modern Egypt, Afaf Marsot describes how under
nominal independence granted by the British, the Egyptian parliament created a constitution
which allowed Fuad to “chose and appointed the Prime Minister and dismiss the cabinet and
postpone the parliament….the king was therefore given too much power, a power he used to
undermine the workings of parliament.”25 However, Fuad's reign was not uncontested since
prominent members, such as Saad Zaghloul of the Wafd party repeatedly challenged the king’s
authority. The abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 then presented the perfect opportunity
for Fuad to not only fill the power vacuum left in the Muslim world but also to silence his
opponents like Zaghloul. It was against this background that Abd al-Raziq's work came to the
forefront in 1925 and criticized, not the fitness of Fuad for the Caliphal office, but rather the
institution of the Caliphate, and its place within the Islamic tradition and history.

*****
Born in 1888 to an illustrious Egyptian landowning family, Ali Abd al-Raziq grew up
around an intellectually energizing environment. He came from a long line of scholars and
political party members as his father Hasan founded the Ummah party in 1907, and one of his

24

Ibid, 54.
Afaf Lutfi Sayyid-Marsot, A Short History of Modern Egypt (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1985), 24.
25
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brothers, Mahmud, co-founded the Liberal Constitutionalist Party in 1922.26 After having
memorized the Quran at the tender age of 10, Ali Abd al-Raziq attended the prestigious Islamic
University of Al-Azhar for “religious” education. There he attained familiarity with Islamic
history, philosophy, jurisprudence, and political theory, as well as knowledge of Quranic
sciences, narrations of Prophetic statements (hadith), and Islamic theology. In 1915, he
graduated with the certificate of a religious scholar (Alim) which allowed him to teach as well as
work in an Islamic court as a judge (Qadi) in the city of Alexandria. During the early 1900’s AlAzhar’s curriculum did not concern itself with western subjects such as ancient philosophy or
modern political science, thus to address this lack Abd al-Raziq went on to attend the University
of Cairo for secular studies. There he worked under the guidance of the Italian Orientalist, Carlo
Alfonso Nallino; he also immersed himself in the study of Islamic history and jurisprudence,
both of which led him to the concept of the Caliphate.27
After attaining his degree at the University of Cairo, Abd al-Raziq traveled to the United
Kingdom and briefly attended the University of Oxford. Unfortunately, he could not finish his
studies due to the effects of World War I in England and thus returned to Egypt soon after. Upon
his return, Abd al-Raziq worked as a Qadi, taught courses, and embarked upon a decade of a
lengthy and extensive investigation into the topic of the Caliphate. Having sifted thoroughly
through authoritative Sunni sources, Abd al-Raziq published his findings on the Caliphate in his
1925 book, al-Islam. It is important to note that the ideas of moving on from the Caliphate, as
well as for its preservation, were all circulating in the Muslim world well before and after the

James Broucek, “The Controversy Of Shaykh ’Ali ’Abd Al-Raziq,” (Phd.diss., The Florida State
University College of Arts and Sciences, 2012), 2.
27
Mona Hassan, “Debating a Modern Caliphate,” in Longing for the Lost Caliphate: A Transregional
History (Princeton University Press, 2016), 225.
26
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demise of the Ottoman Caliphate. While, it is plausible that Abd al-Raziq meant to question King
Fuad's right to the Caliphate, I do not think this explanation alone suffices. I contend that Abd alRaziq was also conducting a revisionist history of the early years of Islam and the Rashidun
Caliphate, thus imbuing the concept of the Caliphate with a modern definition, which was absent
from its past usage.28 Even though Abd al-Raziq’s al-Islam has attracted the most fame and
infamy, he also authored a second lesser known book, titled Al Ijma fi al-Sharia al Islamiyya
(Consensus in Islamic Sharia) in 1947.29 Long after the scandal of losing his judgeship license
due to Al-Azhar’s critique of his book as “unIslamic,” Abd al-Raziq remained active politically
within the Egyptian Parliament and intellectual by teaching at the Egyptian Language
Academy.30 He passed away in 1966, which regenerated once again the controversy surrounding
his book, al-Islam.

*****
The central thesis of al-Islam was that the Caliphate, a political institution since the early
years of Islamic history, had never been a “religious” obligation. Since its formation, this
institution had little authority over the Sharia and, or other matters of the faith. The Caliphate,
which emerged immediately after the death of the Prophet, was never present during
Muhammad's lifetime. Had it been a central tenet of faith, then Muhammad would undoubtedly
have declared himself the first ever Caliph. However, this was not what occurred. Muhammad
laid the foundations for a pluralist and multi-religious community in Medina where his followers,
including the Medinan Jews, and non-Jewish Arabs (al-Ansar) agreed to cohabit peacefully, as
James Broucek, “The Controversy Of Shaykh ’Ali ’Abd Al-Raziq,” 4.
Mona Hassan, “Debating a Modern Caliphate,” 225.
30
Orit Bakshin, “Ali Abd Al-Raziq,” in The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought,
ed. Gerhard Bowering (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1r2g6m.
28
29
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documented in the authentic Medina Document. Moreover, as Abd al-Raziq further argued,
nowhere in that document was there any mention of the terms Caliphate or Caliph, nor an
obligation for Muslims to establish a specific political order.31
With these facts in mind, Abd al-Raziq presented his argument in three parts. In part one
titled “The Caliphate and Islam,” he deconstructed the linguistic and theological significance of
the term Caliphate, as well as how it had been interpreted by Quranic exegetes, and philosophers
within the Sunni tradition. Abd al-Raziq emphasized that the Caliphate assumed a “religious
significance” retroactively in time, since its definition within the Quran was ambiguous,
occurring only in passages referring to Adam or David instead of Muhammad or any of his
followers. In the second section labeled “Islam and Government,” Abd al-Raziq made one of the
most original contributions within modern Islamic political theory by reinterpreting Prophet
Muhammad’s legacy. He described Muhammad’s leadership as purely “religious” which was
different from the Orientalists’ description of him as a shrewd and brilliant military strategist,
tactician, and politician.
In the third and final section of his book “The Caliphate and the Government throughout
History,” Abd al-Raziq defended his main argument regarding the separation of “religious” and
political authority in Islam. Since the Caliphate was never required for believers, and since
Prophet Muhammad was only a messenger of God, then logically the Caliphate of Muhammad’s
successors --the Rashidun-- were all primarily political, in Abd al-Raziq's opinion. Therefore, he

For a detailed reading of the Medina Constitution/Charter consult; Michael Lecker, The “Constitution
of Medina,” in Muhammad’s First Legal Document, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).
Moreover, Walid Nuwayhid, “Chapter 8: The Medina Charter,” in Human Rights in Arab Thought; A
Reader, ed. Salma K. Jayyussi (New York; I. B. Taurus, 2005), 229-249.
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insisted that the Caliphate was never incumbent upon the believers, and indeed not upon the
modern Muslims.
In sum, Abd al-Raziq asserted that “religious” authority or the authority exercised by
Prophet Muhammad as a messenger and prophet, had ceased with his death, and did not transfer
on to the Rashidun, or the religious scholars (Ulama), nor the Muslim Community (Ummah).
Furthermore, he described Islam as a din, which was much more than simply a “religion,” and as
such did not necessitate the establishment of a particular form of political institution.32 The
Caliphate, as well as the concept of giving allegiance to a Caliph (bay’a), were both innovative
concepts which involved some form of duress according to Abd al-Raziq. Also, electing a Caliph
with public consensus (ijma) occurred only at specific instances in Islam’s history, thus reviving
the Caliphate as a political institution was no longer a necessity for Muslims of his time.33

*****
In part one Abd al-Raziq grappled with the term Khalifa as mentioned in the Quran,
which refers to a person who stands as a substitute for someone else. Based on this Quranic
definition, all political leaders who followed Muhammad, were Khalifat Rasul Allah rather than
Khilafat Allah, in Abd al-Raziq’s opinion.34 However some Ulama had extended the title of
God's Caliph on to all of humanity as descendants of Adam, who was the first human, and
assigned the title of Khalifa on earth, as Allah proclaimed, “I shall appoint a deputy (Khalifa) on

“Din can generally refer to any path that humans follow for their lives or more specifically to Islam as
the comprehensive way of life chosen by God for humanity's temporal and eternal benefit. Din
encompasses beliefs, thought, character, behavior, and deeds… which comprises Islam.” John L Esposito,
“Din,” Oxford Islamic Studies Online, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e541.
33
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earth.”35 As a deputy and substitute, a Caliph by Quranic definition could not precede a
Messenger or Prophet, given the elevated status (darjah) of the latter, within the hierarchies of
God's creations. However, Muslims scholars had committed this exact error as Abd a-Raziq
mentions, “these scholars (those who permit the term God’s Caliph) suggested that the Caliph
assumes the same position as the Prophet towards the faithful…he (Caliph) becomes the
supreme overseer and defender of the faith.”36 Hence Abd al-Raziq found the elevation of the
status of Caliphs to the status of Prophet Muhammad problematic, since it was their fellow
Muslims who chose the former, rather than appointed directly by God.
Abd al-Raziq also problematized the extent to which Sunni scholars had encouraged
obedience within the Ummah, which resulted in out of proportion devotion to the Caliphs. He
argued that if a fallible being always filled the Caliphal position and not a divinely chosen human
such as Prophet Muhammad, then both the Caliph and the Caliphate could never be the
equivalent of a Prophet or Prophethood. As the Islamic profession of faith also made apparent in
his view, Muslims declared their belief in the unity of God and the finality of His messenger,
Muhammad. Thus, he wrote, “We cannot find, in the entire body of the (Islamic) tradition, any
evidence that the institution of the Caliphate was a matter of religious dogma, or that it was
entailed by religious belief.”37
In part two, Abd al-Raziq differentiated the duties associated with Prophethood versus
those invested under the title of a Caliph who had temporal authority. He convincingly asserted
that a Muslim Caliph’s responsibilities entailed providing security, protection, and defense--as
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well as conducting warfare—and establishing order and being just. Here Abd al-Raziq admitted
there appears to be some overlap between the functions of a Caliph and those executed by
Prophet Muhammad, since the latter also conducted raids (maghazi), fought against disbelievers,
and resolved conflicts amongst his community members.38 However, Muhammad's primary duty
was to preach the word of God, in Abd al-Raziq's scholarly opinion.
For Prophets, the activity of preaching is a performance which aims at transforming the
listeners morally, and converting them as fellow believers in the present.39 Similarly, Prophet
Muhammad's role was to guide his community by teaching them how to be morally good
Muslims since Islam is an embodied practice rather than a declaration of faith. Abd al-Raziq
understood the power of Prophetic preaching as performed when he wrote, “Religious
preaching…takes effect only by word, by the change wrought in the heart through persuasion,
by an impact on human sensibility. Religious preaching cannot take effect by coercion or force;
thus, in the Quran God himself declares that.”40
While Prophet Muhammad and his followers participated in warfare to protect their faith
and community, this was a unique case: an instance of “religious” and political authority existing
simultaneously, Abd al-Raziq explained. Above all, Muhammad’s most important task was to
guide his community and instill faith as a Messenger and Prophet, a role which was later adopted
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by Holy Men.41 For Abd al-Raziq, Prophecy was a unique role which could not be performed by
any temporal ruler since “This role (Prophethood) involves a function which is unique and which
he does not share with anyone else."42 Since Prophet Muhammad was the last Prophet of his
kind, and since no one after him could claim the mantle of prophecy, it followed that the
leadership after his death came to be purely political. For Abd al-Raziq, Prophet Muhammad was
a reformer and renewer of faith, who had no need for coercion or violence, unlike the figure of a
Caliph. The Caliph was a political leader who did not refrain from using coercion and violence to
assert his power. This is how Abd al-Raziq summarized his views:
“It is equally understandable that the authority of a new type, sharing nothing with the function of
transmitting the divine message…should appear after him (Muhammad). This would have to be a secular
power, a temporal or political rather than a “religious” power. This is in fact what happened.”43

In the last section of his book, Abd al-Raziq boldly claimed that the Caliphate was an
innovation from the age of the Rashidun who, despite their piety, were never inheritors of
Prophetic authority since one group or another opposed each Caliph. This meant that none of
them was chosen unanimously by the Ummah. For example, the war of Apostasy (Haroub alRiddah) immediately after Abu Bakr was chosen to lead the Muslim community, occurred
because all three parties including; the Mecca emigrants (Muhajirun), the Medinan helpers (alAnsar), and Prophet Muhammad’s companions, were competing for the Caliphal title. This was a
political struggle which was later assigned a “religious” significance long after the events. Abd
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al-Raziq described the outcome of these wars as, “These rivalries persisted until allegiance was
finally given to Abu Bakr… this allegiance had very much to do with a temporal or political
pledge; that it had all the attributes of a newly created state.”44 According to Abd al-Raziq, these
wars and contests over the Caliphal office cannot be described as Wars of “Apostasy” since they
never represented a threat to the faith. Neither Abu Bakr, nor any of the Rashidun ever pretended
to take over Muhammad’s role as a Prophet, as evident by Abu Bakr declaration, “O people, I am
one of you. I do not know whether you will expect from me things that the Messenger of God
could offer. God has elected Muhammad over all his creation, and has protected him from error,
while I am merely a follower.”45
By establishing specific points against the “religious” significance of the Caliphate, Abd
al-Raziq concluded that Muslims were free to create any form of government as long as it upheld
Islamic values of justice as delineated within the Sharia.46 He explained that since the body of
Islamic law (Sharia) had allowed Muslims to make changes to its structure, believers did not
have to follow failed models of governance such as the Ottoman Caliphate.47 In the final section,
he also insisted that “this institution (Caliphate) has nothing to do with Islam (din). No principle
prevents those (modern Muslims) from dismantling this obsolete system; from building their
state and their system of government based on past constructions of human reason.”48 While
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elaborating on an alternative political model would have strengthened Abd al-Raziq’s case
further, one hypothesizes that his intentions were not to force a model on to the Ummah.49
Instead, Abd al-Raziq left the door ajar to the political possibilities, thus allowing the
Ummah to make political decisions collectively. Most importantly, the primary purpose of his
work, I believe, was to demonstrate the historical significance of the Caliphate as a political
institution and not an article of faith or an inherent part of Islam as a din. By making his
argument against the revival of the Caliphate, Abd al-Raziq opened the space for Muslims to
imagine the modern state as a viable replacement to the political intuition he identified as the
Caliphate. He made the argument that political sovereignty in Islamic history had always been
secular, since the Caliphate was never authorized with the right to lead or guide the Muslim
community. Thus, in his opinion, Muslims should not aspire for this political institution, and
instead should seek other ways of organizing themselves befitting the needs of their present.

*****
Both Muslim and Western scholars have wondered why Abd al-Raziq, a Sunni religious

scholar and Sharia court judge, made a case against the historic Caliphate? Was he reframing
Orientalist arguments in Islamic garb, as his critics charged him? Alternatively, was he
remolding the discursive Islamic tradition in the image of liberalism? Questions such as these
abounded throughout the Muslim world in 1925 and continue to do so today. Some scholars
suggest his motives were primarily political; to criticize King Fuad who was vying for the
Caliphal title immediately after Ottoman Caliphate's fall in 1924. Others counter that Abd al49

According to Butterworth, the biggest shortcoming of Abd al-Raziq’s work was his failure to offer
concrete suggestions and alternative political reforms in place of the Caliphate. “Those critics have had an
easy time largely because Abd al-Raziq is so vague about what he means by change, reform, and
modernization. At no point does he identify the political or social organizations he desires or thinks
Muslims now need” (p.239).
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Raziq's secular education during the first decade of the 20th century, under the mentorship of
Western Orientalists, led him to present a revisionist account of both Islamic history and
tradition. The first part of this section discusses hypotheses from both groups of scholars, those
relying upon political motives versus those who attribute it to conditions engendered by the
modernizing project. Such a comparison allows us to analyze how scholars overall have received
and read Abd al-Raziq's ideas. After accomplishing this, I proceed to summarize how three
distinct ideological schools such as the Revivalists, Muslim Laicists, and Modern liberals, have
responded to Abd al-Raziq's work. This information serves well to emphasize how Muslims
vertically- meaning cross-culturally, and horizontally- meaning those from Abd al-Raziq's time
until our present, have read and (re)read al-Islam, thus disagreeing about what the Caliphate
means.
Lastly, I present my analysis of Abd al-Raziq’s legacy by utilizing Samira Haj’s ideas in
Reconfiguring the Islamic Tradition. I argue that categories such as “liberal,” “secular,” and
“laicist,” hinder more than they aid, as these categories overlook Abd al-Raziq’s commitment to
Islam which he repeatedly affirmed within al-Islam. By eliminating these Western-centric
categories, we can appreciate Abd al-Raziq’s ideas as a question on the nature of political power
within the Islamic tradition while also responding to the conditions of possibility available to him
at that time.

*****
Orientalist scholars have consistently argued that Abd al-Raziq’s al-Islam was a political
statement against King Fuad, camouflaged as a critical historical analysis of the Caliphate
institution. For instance, the Orientalist, Leonard Binder in Islamic Liberalism claimed that Abd
al-Raziq’s al-Islam was directed at King Fuad’s ambition to reclaim the title of the Caliphate for
20

himself.50 However, Binder’s explanation does not necessarily explain why Abd al-Raziq
favored the dismantling of the Caliphate? Surely it would have been easier for him to support the
Ottoman Caliph, Abdulmecid II, Sharif Hussain of Mecca, or any other better-suited candidates
instead of Fuad. Why then argue against how Modern Muslims had come to conceive of Prophet
Muhammad’s legacy and that of the Rashidun Caliphate? As an alternative to the Orientalists’
hypotheses, I find James Broucek’s perspective helpful, which explains why Abd al-Raziq's
efforts were a form of “revisionist history of the Prophet’s mission, and Abu Bakr's Caliphate.”51
Broucek describes that while Abd al-Raziq was guided by his Orientalist Professor
Nallion, to conduct a revisionist history of the early years of Islam, he managed to depart from
his mentor's ideas significantly. He trod an “uncharted territory” by asking, what was the nature
of Prophet Muhammad’s mission and the first Caliphate after his death? Abd al-Raziq's response
to these questions did not signify a “fabrication of history” as was often the charge by some of
his critics. Instead, in Broucek’s opinion, he was “inventing the (Islamic) tradition” as is
commonly done by members of various “religious” communities throughout history, who
reformulate their origins narratives when experiencing historical changes.52 I, on the other hand,
do not find Abd al-Raziq to be reinventing the Islamic tradition, but rather remolding the
definition of Caliphate from his present lens, and genealogically tracing how the separation of
powers was historically present within the Islamic tradition.
Arab scholars Mona Hassan and Souad Ali favor the ‘conditions of modernity
hypothesis’ to explain why Abd al-Raziq attacked the historic Caliphate and not Fuad’s
Binder, Islamic Liberalism, 132. Binder offers a useful analysis of ‘Abd al-Raziq’s arguments,
including a summary the first half of his book which was a refutation of both Ibn Khaldun’s and Rashid
Rida’s theories of the Caliphate.
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candidacy directly. In their opinions, Abd al-Raziq’s work was primarily a departure from the
legacy of the Egyptian “modernizer” Muhammad Abduh (d.1905), thus reflecting the influence
of his secular Western education. Both Hassan and Ali find Abd al-Raziq implicitly promoting
the idea of a secular state and a de-politicized Islam. Mona Hassan, in Longing for the Lost
Caliphate further hypothesizes that Abd al-Raziq looked upon a secularized Turkey for
inspiration. There a certain Mehmet Sayyid Celebizade supported the Ottoman Caliphate’s
abolition by arguing how the Muslim community could easily revoke the power they had once
endowed upon the Caliph.53
Also, according to Souad Ali, multiple factors, such as the persistent independence
discourses of the mid-20s, the availability of Western education, and the interactions with
Orientalist faculty at the University of Cairo—all contributed to the formation of Abd al-Raziq’s
secular opinions.54 Additionally, Abd al-Raziq’s privileged position as a members of the Liberal
Constitutionalist Party, and his fear of an autocratic monarchy, led him to favor the secular
model of separation of religious and political powers. This was modeled on the complex history
of separation of Church and State, which had emerged out of Western Christian Europe.
Here we must remember that the separation of Church and State did not exist inherently
within Christianity, contrary to popular opinions. New Testament scholar, Elaine Pagels’
groundbreaking research on the Gnostic texts has shown, that during the early ministry of Peter a
political struggle ensued between Jesus’s disciples regarding who had the authority to lead
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believers. Pagels writes, “The central tenets of Christian faith were constructed to confer
legitimacy on to a select group of men (eleven apostles like Peter), who claimed to have
witnessed Jesus’ resurrection first hand, though we have only second-hand testimony from
believers who affirm this and skeptics who deny it.”55 Historicizing the Western European
separation of powers between Church and State makes apparent the specific conditions in time
and history which lead to this phenomenon. Abd al-Raziq was not encouraging modern Muslims
of his time to emulate this Western phenomenon but rather was challenging their reconstruction
of early Islamic history, and their reverence for the category of the Caliphate.
While I agree with Hassan, that Sayyid Bey’s ideas may have bolstered Abd al-Raziq’s
confidence in publishing al-Islam, I find Abd al-Raziq's scope much broader than Bey’s since the
latter redefined Prophet Muhammad's authority in his work; I also do not doubt that by working
with Nallino and reading Orientalist, Thomas Arnold's The Caliphate, affected Abd al-Raziq
profoundly. However, I emphasize that his work was more than just a political statement since he
did not offer any concrete remedies or solutions on how Egyptians political leaders could replace
the Caliphate or King Fuad's authority. This is something lacking within his work, and I will
offer my hypothesis on this later on.56

*****
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Muslims, who adhere to a literal interpretation of authoritative Islamic sources of the
Quran and hadith, are generally thought of as “Traditionalists” or as “Literalists.” Renowned
Anthropologist, Talal Assad, however, cautions that categories of “tradition” and especially
“Islamic tradition” cannot be envisioned as being static or frozen in time. Assad writes, “The
internal temporal structure of tradition is obscured if we represent it as the inheritance of an
unchanging cultural substance from the past.” 57 Hence disregarding the term “Traditionalists,” I
label one specific group of Muslims as “Revivalists” because this designation adequately
captures how they imagine the historic Caliphate, and how in their opinion, this institution
should be revived in modern times. I am also discarding the term “Literalist”" since the
Revivalists’ aspirations are not limited to what the literal word of the Quran and hadith states.
As I have repeatedly mentioned above, Abd al-Raziq was a Muslim reformer attempting
to find new ways of accommodating modern political sovereignty, i.e., the state, without
compromising the Islamic faith. For Abd al-Raziq, historically speaking, the Caliphate was
merely a political institution, implicitly suggesting that its replacement with the modern state is
not un-Islamic. Others, like the Revivalists, however aspire to reviving a Caliphate modeled after
the early era of Islam, and the era of Prophet Muhammad and his successors, as an institution
that would combine both political and religious authority. For them, Abd al-Raziq's work was a
gross misrepresentation and distortion of Islamic history. They chastised him for discarding the
Caliphate, upon which “all Muslims” have agreed on for centuries. In their opinion there could
57
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only be two explanations for Abd al-Raziq’s work: he was either taking credit for a non-Muslim
Western writer or he was colluding with the British imperialists by weakening the solidarity of
the Egyptian Muslims with his work.
The most prominent voices of opposition against Abd al-Raziq’s ideas were his
colleagues from Al-Azhar who brought specific charges against him, held a trial, and eventually
revoked his judgeship license.58 These peers charged Abd al-Raziq with denigrating the status of
the Sharia by arguing that it did not necessitate the Caliphate in Islamic tradition. They also
accused him of distorting the nature of Prophetic government, negating the “religious” nature of
the consensus (ijma) of the first Islamic community, as well as the piety of the Rashidun by
labeling them as Kings. Even though both Abd al-Raziq’s and his critics’ goal was the same, to
preserve and enforce the Sharia, they disagreed on the nature of political authority in Islam as
delineated by this system.
It is pertinent to remember that the project of modernization in 19th and 20th century
Egypt, with its creation of European inspired schools, armies, and administrations, as Wael
Hallaq articulates, “came to displace almost every sphere that the Sharia and its related
institutions had occupied. The effect of these reforms was to create a new subject, the citizen,
who sees the world through the eyes of the modern state.”59 Meaning the Sharia, which Abd alRaziq had encountered in his present, and was different from the one, which had been
historically present during the time of the Rashidun.
Abd al-Raziq like other modern Muslims, was conscripted in the project of modernity
and could not help but internalize the concepts of free reason, rationality, and political
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sovereignty as necessary replacements to the Caliphate. Thus, in his book, Abd al-Raziq stated
that “Sharia cannot be used to justify certain State institutions…state cannot claim to enforce
Sharia, and that people need to use reason to oppose the state (in that matter).”60 However, this
is precisely what the Egyptian state had done by curtailing Sharia's scope of regulatory power,
which was not limited initially to the “private” sphere but had played a significant role in the
shaping of the moral sensibilities of believers.61
Additionally, among the Revivalists, who also disagreed with Abd al-Raziq’s
interpretation of the Sharia and the early era of Islam, was the Syrian journalist Muhammad
Rashid Rida (d.1935), who been a student of Abd al-Raziq’s teacher, Muhammad Abduh.62
Abduh is frequently described in Western scholarship as a “liberal” Islamic reformer, who
wanted to “Westernize” the Islamic education system, beginning with the University of al-Azhar.
Abduh’s experience as a student at Al-Azhar during the mid 19th century, and his struggles with
classical methods of learning, namely; memorization and oral recitation, led him to perceive the
quality of Islamic education as outdated and ineffective. Nontheless, Abduh desired to “bridge
the gap between what Islamic societies should be, and what they had become, and in what sense
can Muslim societies be truly Muslim?”63 This was a dilemma for Abduh-- how to grapple with
the perverseness of modernization and secularization taking place during 19th century Egypt,
while also preserving the ethical sensibilities of being a Muslim? In the face of these conditions,
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Abduh advocated for educational reform in Islamic learning at Al-Azhar. However, as Asad
decribes, Abduh’s dilemma remained in tact as he attempted to define the Sharia:
“On one hand he (Abduh) complains that teaching and examining the Sharia in al-Azhar pays far
too much attention to ibadat (rituals of worship) and far too little to muamlat (rules for social relations).
But he also says that the judge’s authority requires more than intellectual competence, and that it depends
on his developing certain moral aptitudes and predispositions.”64

As a Muslim, Abduh wanted to preserve the limited role of the Sharia in the face of
Western encroachment, but as a modern subject, he also had internalized subjectivities of
Western Europe, as shaped by the concept of the Secular and the political doctrine of
Secularism.65 Abd al-Raziq similarly conceived of Sharia not as a template which allowed every
individual Muslim to decide for themselves which political system they desired to live in, but
rather as a guiding roadmap for the Ummah since the “Sharia rejects the idea that the moral
subject is completely sovereign…Islamic jurists regard the individual’s ability to judge what
conduct is right and good (for oneself as well for others) to be dependent…on embodied
relationships.”66
While Rashid Rida did not have a formal secular education like Abd al-Raziq, he too
internalized the vocabulary of the modern subjectedhood. We know Rida had written on the
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topic of the Caliphate as early on as the 1890’s when “drawing upon Abduh's work, he (Rida)
supported the Ottoman Caliph Abdulmecid II.”67 While Rida remained critical of Abdulmecid’s
failure as a Caliph, he hoped that the built-in mechanisms within the Sharia, such as the principle
of Shura, would allow Muslims to prevent a despotic Caliphate. Additionally, even though
Rida’s opinions on the Caliphate changed throughout his lifetimes, he remained adamant that
Muslims, especially the Arabs with the assistance of Turks, needed to establish a Caliphate to
resist Western imperialism.
In a modern-day Caliphate, Rida envisioned, “the Caliph would not have absolute
authority since in Classical Sunni doctrine those who bind and loose (ahl al-ḥall wal-aqd) would
put constraints on the Caliph’s authority. In modern times it would be all leaders and not just
Ulama who would limit the Caliphate’s reach.”68 This expansion of authority by Rida, to all
Muslim leaders was a modern interpretation of the checks and balances mechanisms, which had
been reserved for only a select group of men within the Sunni tradition. Rida justified his
addition of all the leaders by limiting a Caliph’s power, given the political realities of his present,
as the wave of Pan-Arabism was rising in the Middle East, and as the Ottoman Empire was
taking its last breaths.
It is quite possible that Abd al-Raziq's work against the Caliphate offended Rida, who
had published his call for a renewed Caliphate two years prior in 1923, labeled al-Khilafa au
Imam al-Uzman (Caliphate or the Great Imamate). Immediately after the publication of alIslam, on June 21st, 1925, Rida published a scathing book review of al-Islam in his journal The
Lighthouse (Al Manar) by using the terminology of “falsify,” and “misguidance” to discredit
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Abd al-Raziq’s work. In a 1932 speech, Rida continued his attack on certain “false” reformers,
whom he believed “assumed the leadership of renewal and monopolized the title of Islamic
revivalists.”69 From Rida’s perspective, Abd al-Raziq had falsely propagated an extreme view
which not only made it permissible to abolish the Caliphate but a necessity.70 As an alternative,
Rida proposed that Muslims needed to revive the Caliphate, to fortify against Western
encroachment as well as to take a necessary step towards the revival of the Ummah. However, as
I will discuss next, Muslims Laicists, in disagreement with Rida, embraced Abd al-Raziq's
arguments and called for the end of the Caliphate as a viable institution in modern times.

*****
Laicism, the predecessor of the concept of Secularism, first emerged during the French
Revolution and insisted upon the separation of a “religious” institutions from the political ones.71
What makes Muslim Laicists distinct from ordinary Muslims is their rejection of an Islamic State
or the Caliphate based on “religious” reasons. Essentially, Muslim Laicists demand a pluralist
society in which a state would represent all cultures and groups regardless of religious or atheist
affiliation. They also enthusiastically praise Abd al-Raziq’s work to justify the creation of such a
society, which would emphasize individual liberties.72 Overall, Muslim Laicists find Laicism to
be complementary to Islam rather than its antithesis, and argue that Abd al-Raziq was not the
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only thinker to advance such a position.73 However, as James Broceuk would counter, “it would
be more accurate to categorize Abd al-Raziq's work as a refutation of Islamism rather than a
promotion of secularism since he never offered how living in a secular state would be beneficial
for the believers.”74 Nonetheless, some prominent supporters of Abd al-Raziq in this group
include Professor of Islamic Law Abdullahi Ahmed al-Naim.75
Al-Na’im as a passionate defender of Laicism asserts, “I need a secular state because
Sharia cannot be coerced due to the fear of the state.”76 His arguments can be summarized as
such; Laicist ideology does not contradict but complements Islam. Though Islam has political
components, this should not be a reason to establish an Islamic State or the Caliphate since the
state has always relied upon a legitimized monopoly of violence and has enlisted political elites
for support.77 Furthermore, there was no established authority on the moral necessity of the
Caliphate in classical or medieval Islamic political theory as Abd al-Raziq has argued in his
work. Thus, for Al-Na'im any state which upholds one “religion” over others would be coercive
in power, encroach on its citizens human rights, and hence could never be Islamic.
73
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Furthermore, Al-Na’im explains, “Muslims need not perceive the secular state as a threat
to Islamic politics since it has an interest in promoting political participation.”78 However, we
know from Michel Foucault, Asad, and Hallaq’s work, that this view is very much the myth
espoused by Modernity as a tradition. The state, using its diffused power and governmentality,
dominates and refashions modern subjects, both externally by disciplining their bodies, and
internally by leading them to internalize the values of secularism, liberalism, rationalism,
humanism, and the uncompleted project of the Enlightenment.79 Al-Na’im’s endorsement of
Laicism, can thus be explained as his reading of the historic Caliphate as a modern subject. One
needs to remember the historic Caliphate, under the Rashidun never functioned like a modern
state. Only the Ottoman Caliphate, under the conditions of modernity, eventually enacted
secularization reforms in 1839 and began to form state structures.80 Before presenting my
hypothesis on Abd al-Raziq’s motivation for writing al-Islam, I now briefly discuss the reactions
of Modern liberals, who find in Abd al-Raziq a kindred spirit.

*****
Some Modern liberals maintain that Abd al-Raziq’s work does not fit neatly within rigid
ideological camps of “liberal” or “secular” since he would not have described himself as such.
According to Christian Donath, Abd al-Raziq’s definition of Sharia place him closer to his
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opponents’ comfort.81 While I commend Donath for attempting to break out of rigid and
misleading categories, I believe Abd al-Raziq’s ideas do not overlap with those calling for the
revival of the Caliphate. As explained earlier, the Revivalists maintain the “religious” legitimacy
of the Caliphate while Abd al-Raziq does not. Thus, both are not on the same spectrum, though I
emphasize that Abd al-Raziq’s stance does not make him any less Muslim, than Revivalists, as
other polemics claim.
Nonetheless, Donath persuasively shows how important the application of the Sharia was
for Abd al-Raziq when he wrote, “Islam does not impose upon Muslims a particular type of
government…but allows us to choose the form that can facilitate the application of the Sharia.”82
Hence in Donath’s opinion, it would be incorrect to label Abd al-Raziq and his work as
advocating Liberalism, Laicism, or Secularism since his intentions were not to erect a barrier
between state power and religious life; instead, he wished to invite both groups to begin
discussions on how Muslims can proceed from the fall of the Caliphate. Here I find Donath’s
analysis convincing and concur, that Abd al-Raziq was not advocating for a liberal definition of
Islam, but trying to justify why the need for a Caliphate in the modern context was no longer
necessary.83 Donath is also correct in assessing how Abd al-Raziq vigorously defended the
Sharia which is “often ignored by his critics and supporters alike.”84 I further add that Abd alRaziq’s aim, was not to question the authority of the Ulama or denigrate Islam as a din. His
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original critique of the Caliphate served as a wake-up call for the Ummah to discuss other
pressing matters, such as what comes next and how can this discussion begin. 85

*****
I will now bring forth my interpretation of Abd al-Raziq’s motives behind his al-Islam,
what he hoped to accomplish in my opinion, as well as my solution on how we can reinterpret
his legacy by eliminating Western-centric labels, which have been attached to his work
uncritically for far too long. I hypothesize that Abd al-Raziq conducted a scholarly investigation
and historical revision on the concept of the Caliphate. An important fact to keep in mind is that
Abd al-Raziq began his research at the University of Cairo and continued it for over a decade.
Even though he was an Alim (religious scholar) and Qadi (judge), he was also a Muslim curious
about the exalted status of the Caliphate which had assumed a timeless essence within the
Islamic tradition. Thus, he wondered, have Muslims always venerated this institution or is it a
recent phenomenon? Most importantly, why has this institution gained the status of the article of
faith (Iman), when it was human-made and never established by the Prophet? All Muslims are
aware that Prophet Muhammad’s first community was not a Caliphate, and neither was he the
first Caliph. In other words, I would say, Abd al-Raziq’s work questioned when Prophetic
authority ended and when temporal politics began within Islamic history.
Above all, he argued within the discursive Islamic tradition as an Alim, by applying his
independent reasoning (ijtihad) and locating his arguments in Quranic verses and limited
numbers of hadith. This is what renews and reforms Islam as a din--a constant generation of
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novel ideas, debates, disagreements, and discussions occurring internally within the tradition.86
While his description of Prophet Muhammad's leadership as only a “religious” leader might not
entirely convince all Muslims, we must remember that the idea of separate concepts like
“religious” and “political” authority was not part of the language or culture of the tribal society
within which the Prophet and his message of Islam unfolded. This distinction emerged in the
modern age when a modern state dictated the separation of religion and state. It is the modern
state of being that led to Abd al-Raziq's response that the Caliphate itself was never a “religious”
institution, unlike the Catholic church in Western Europe. His stance, however, does not make
Abd al-Raziq either a liberal or secularist as stated by his opposition, and requires that we engage
closely with his ideas rather than dismiss or miscategorize them.
I demand that we place Abd al-Raziq’s work on the Caliphate within the Islamic tradition
and reimagine what it is meant by both the terms “Tradition” and “Islamic tradition.”
Philosopher, Alasdair MacIntyre like Talal Asad, cautions that “Tradition is an ever-changing set
of socially embodied arguments extended through times…which certain fundamental agreements
are defined and redefined through debating with external enemies and internal debates.”87
Traditions are constituted and reconstituted through debates, disagreements, and paradoxes, thus
embodying a fluidiy. Similarly, Islam as a tradition, has a fluid and dynamic movement
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(harakiyya).88 Since renewal (tajdid), reform (islah), and revival (iihya) are all authentic and
necessary aspects of Islam as a faith and tradition, Islam should be described as a living tradition,
which moves, breathes, evolves, and changes given the conditions of believers’ time and
contexts.89 Therefore, Abd al-Raziq, in my opinion made an internal critique of the Caliphate
within the Islamic tradition, and not simply a secular, modern, or liberal claim.

*****
As this section has shown, I strongly disagree with the hypothesis that Ali Abd alRaziq’s work can and should be categorized under the labels of Liberalism, Laicism, and
Secularism. These are Western and Eurocentric terms, which distract us from pondering upon
what Abd al-Raziq left unstated in his work. I believe that was the main thrust of his work, to
move on from the Caliphate debate and discuss what comes next for the Ummah, and how
Muslims can adhere to the Sharia in the modern age? Abd al-Raziq's work is relevant even today
as certain fundamentalist Islamic groups continue to co-opt the term “Caliphate” and the past to
justify their political ends. Even though we can only imagine the past through the lens of the
present, we still can preserve some of it’s essence by saving quotes.90 Thus, I close this section
with a quote from Abd al-Raziq as he stood by his work until the end by declaring, “I do not
revoke it (my stance). I have never revoked it.”91
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In the following section, I move to discuss South Asian Muslims’ reception of al-Islam
by primarily focusing on sources in Urdu. As I will discuss below, several books and chapters
have been devoted to discussions of al-Islam, and the historical context within which it emerged,
precisely at the height of the Caliphate debate in 1925. There are also secondary sources which
endlessly discuss and debate Abd al-Raziq's assertion that the Caliphate had been retroactively
elevated as part of faith, while historically it had been a purely political institution. These sources
also emphasize the broader impact of his ideas evident from the multi-lingual translations of his
book, now available in French, German, Farsi, Malay, and Turkish. However, most secondary
literature has failed to take notice or even mention the existence of an Urdu language translation
of his work, titled Islam aur Usul-i Hukumat.92
My recovery of this Urdu translation is significant, because it addresses a glaring gap in
modern scholarship, since, to my knowledge no secondary source on Abd al-Raziq’s critique of
the Caliphate has mentioned this Urdu translation. I suspect this is the case since, since most
Muslims and Western scholars focused on the immediate impact of al-Islam after its publication
in Egypt in 1925 and, more broadly the reactions engendered by this book, within the Arab world
today. However, such scholars have failed to address how Muslims received Abd al-Raziq's
work in other regions such as South Asia, South East Asia, Central Asia, and even Europe.93
Thus as a remedy I asses the Urdu language translation and bring forth the reception of one
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Pakistani academic, while also offering a glimpse into how other intellectuals other than
Egyptians and Arabs reviewed Abd al-Raziq’s work.94
By making use of this translation and other primary Urdu sources, I discovered that the
Ulama and other academics rejected Abd al-Raziq's theory of the Caliphate as based upon, what
they interpreted as, some faulty premises. The convergence of opinions amongst South Asian
Muslims leads me to hypothesize that the failure of the Khilafat Movement in 1922, the nature of
education in Islamic learning institutions (Madrasa/Mudaras) in this region, and the creation of
Pakistan in 1947, all contributed to shaping South Asian Muslims’ conceptualization of the
Caliphate. Additionally, I argue that Abd al-Raziq’s stance on the Caliphate provided an
opportunity for some South Asian Muslims to extend their critiques from his work, on to the
European project of modernity. In what follows, I focus on the voices of the Indian and Pakistani
Muslims, including the Ulama from Nadawat al-Ulama Institution, as well as other South Asian
academics and intellectuals.95 I start with Raja F. M. Majid’s translation and critique of al-Islam,
written approximately between 1952-53 but published in 1960. The second part of this section
discusses reviews of al-Islam by the renowned Indian Ulama, Maulana Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi
(d.1998), and Maulana Muhammad Raziul Islam Nadi (b.1964), both of whom also obtained
their religious training from Nadwat al-Ualam school.
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A quick search on the name Raja Fakhr Muhammad Majid does not yield any significant
results these days. The only information available is from the Middle East Journal article which
documented Majid’s status as a visiting staff at the McGill University between the year 195253.96 All the other information regarding his project comes from what he chooses to tell us in the
preface. Specially, we learn that Majid worked closely with Canadian Orientalist, Wilfred
Cantwell Smith (d.2000) who suggested this project.97 We also discover that Majid had met Abd
al-Raziq in person, in Cairo, to obtain his permission for the Urdu translation. In addition to
reading the original Arabic version, Majid also accessed Charles C Adams’s English translation
of al-Islam to ensure the accuracy of his translation.98 While Majid does not specify his reasons
for the translation, it is likely that he felt the need to respond to Abd al-Raziq's compelling
arguments against the "religious" necessity of the Islamic Caliphate.
In the preface, Majid skillfully summarized the life and career of Abd al-Raziq, who was
alive at the time of this translation in 1960. From his summary, we learn that Abd al-Raziq had
the privilege of personally learning from the renowned Egyptian reformer, Muhammad Abduh
while attending the University of Al-Azhar in 1911.99 Significantly Majid confirmed Abd alRaziq’s testimony that the history of Sharia eventually led Abd al-Raziq to wonder how Muslims
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constructed the significance of the Caliphate over the years.100 However, immediately Majid
contradicted himself by commenting, " اور اسی زما نے میں (فواد اول جب مصرکے حکمران تہے آپ یعنی
”شیخ علی عبدالرازق یہ کتاب اإلسالم لکہی جس سے درپردہ ان کا مقصد فواد اول کے دعواۓ خالفت کا ابطال تہا
“during this time period (when Fuad I was the King of Egypt) his (Sheikh Abd al-Raziq’s book
al-Islam) was written with an implicit agenda of demolishing the King’s political ambitions of
becoming the next Caliph.”
As I have argued earlier, Abd al-Raziq began working on this project long before the
Caliphate debate or the abolition of this institution. In the introduction of the original Arabic
version of al-Islam, Abd al-Raziq informed his readers, “I must state that these pages are the
fruit of labor in which I have invested the better part of my energies for many years.”101 As a
Muslim scholar, it was part of Abd al-Raziq’s professional training to not only produce scholarly
works related to Islamic jurisprudence but also to engage with debates, disagreements, and
reinterpretation of specific topics such as the role of Sharia and the Caliphate in modern times.
Thus, unlike Majid and some other scholars, we should not overlook this crucial aspect of Abd
al-Raziq's testimony. Within the preface, Majid also made a sweeping statement about al-Islam,
“ ایسے موضوع پر لکہی گی تی جو مسلمانا عالم کے نزدیک صدیوں تک ناقابل تردیدہا اور.یہ کتاب پہلی مر تبہ ایک
 ”جسے امرخداوندی سمجہا گیاmeaning, “for first time a book like this discussed a topic (the
Caliphate) upon which the entire Muslim world had previously agreed on for centuries and
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which they had considered a crucial part of expressing devotion and obedience to Allah.”102 Here
again, I take issue with Majid’s reductionist statement, since as early as 1922, thinkers like
Sayyid Bey of Turkey had published a book to justify the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate.
While Bey’s work was created to bolster the support for Mustafa Kemal’s decision, it still
constituted an intellectual project written by a Muslim thinker for the consumption of other
Muslims. Thus even before the publication of al-Islam in 1924 Muslims were making a case for
the end of the Caliphate.
My critique of Majid’s statement further gains strength from the fact that Indian Khalifat
movement which emerged in 1914 in India, and favored preserving the Ottoman Caliphate, never
grew up to be a mass political movement in the region.103 Thus the collapse of this movement
highlighted that even amongst South Asian Muslims, not everyone supported the preservation of
the Caliphate. Most importantly, in Islam-aur-Usual-i-Hukumat, Majid critiqued Abd al-Raziq’s
ideas in defense of the Caliphate by stating “this institution of the Caliphate was not as bad as the
Sheikh had so described in his work. Hence why his work was considered so offensive.”104
Majid does not specify whether the Egyptian scholar's work was considered offensive only in
Egypt at the time of its publication, or for all Muslims? Though it is highly likely that Majid took
offense to Abd al-Raziq's work as he continued, “while no one in the Muslim world had any
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qualms about the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate or the book al-Islam, we find his work to be
unconvincing and unacceptable.”105
To counter Abd al-Raziq's “offensive” arguments against the necessity of the Caliphate,
Majid posed the following questions; a) If the Quran has not assigned the Caliphate a "religious"
significance then why did not the first community of Muslims raise this objection when pledging
allegiance to Abu Bakr? b) How has the Muslim community allowed the Caliphate to exist for
1300 years and only recently began to raise objections against its legitimacy? c) If, as Abd alRaziq stated, the concept of Ijma does not support the reinstatement of the Caliphate in the
present, then what is the definition of this term? In Majid’s opinion, the Prophetic hadith that
"my community will never agree on any error" and the constant presence of the Caliphate both
proved that the Ummah had given their Ijma to this institution, thereby collapsing the definition
of Caliphate and ijma as one.106
Since Muslims have always pledged their allegiance to a Caliphal figure, for Majid, this
proved that the Ummah had deemed the Caliphate to be as an integral part of the faith. He firmly
asserted that the Caliphate was crucial for the existence of Islam, since it was a mechanism
which ensured Muslims’ access to justice, harmony, and the fulfillment of their obligations as
commanded by Allah.107 Unlike Abd al-Raziq’s recommendation that Muslims should move past
this political institution and establish another form of government, Majid countered, “How is it
possible that Muslims be asked to observe their “religión” and perform all the duties incumbent
on them but then give support to a non-Islamic form of government under which all forbidden
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things such as alcohol and usury are permitted?”108 The anxiety caused by this dilemma became
apparent when Majid mentioned that the Caliphate’s absence would entail the moral corruption
of the Ummah and the annihilation of Islam.
What I find ironic is how Majid was making these claims in 1952, long after the Ottoman
Caliphate's demise. How did Majid reconciled his sweeping statements regarding the Caliphate
with the historical and political realities of his time? I believe the answer lies in the creation of
Pakistan as an Islamic Republic. I suspect Majid conflated the concept of a Republic with that of
the Caliphate, as he stated: “Every government which observes and protects the Sharia is a
Caliphate and should be called as such.”109 Even though it wasn’t until 1956 when Pakistan
officially adopted the title of “ (اِسالمی جمہوریہ پاکِستان/Islamic Republic of Pakistan),” as early as
1948 the Assembly of Pakistan had drafted the basic principles of the country as a place,
“wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective
spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of (Sharia) as set out in the Holy
Quran and the Sunnah.”110 Thus, I suspect if Majid had agreed with Abd al-Raziq's work on the
Caliphate, then it could have been interpreted as subversive to Pakistan's legitimacy. It could
have potentially caused a great scandal in Pakistan since it was in its 5th year of existence by
1952. While I cannot substantiate these claim, the links between Majid's explicit support of a
nonexistent Caliphate in 1952, and the existence of Pakistan are significant and deserve closer
attention.
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What I can prove, on the other hand is that Majid criticized the Western project of
modernity through his critique of al-Islam. This became transparent when Majid forcefully
asserted, “These days religion is a slave to politics whereas in Islamic history it was politics
which had to abide by religion. Abd al-Raziq’s work and its foundations are faulty because they
encourage subverting religion in the hopes of nationalism.”111 To elaborate, Majid provided a
brief history of how the concept of nationalism originated in the West and extended it back
erroneously to England’s Henry VIII time when he broke from the Catholic Church. Majid
described the concept of nationalism as a malaise, which had engulfed the Western world within
its grip, which had motivated colonialism, and led to the two World Wars.112 He lamented that
during his time, the Muslim world had been splintered due to this concept, and Muslims had
forsaken the idea of a trans-regional Ummah.
As a remedy to nationalism, Majid believed the bonds of faith amongst Muslims were
stronger than the idea of an “imagined community” which Benedict Anderson had made famous
through his work in 1983.113 Before concluding his analysis, Majid offered an alternative to the
growing disease of nationalism and further fragmentation of the Muslim world. He proposed
Muslims to, “form a confederation similar to that of United Nations where each Muslims country
would still be in charge of its affairs. However, the federation would oversee justice, defense,
trade, economic relations, and internal affairs.”114 With this recommendation, Majid concluded
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his analyses of al-Islam, clarifying that though he disagreed with Abd al-Raziq's work on the
Caliphate, he would still encourage engagement with his ideas since they do have some merit.

*****
Abul Hassan Ali Nadwi's scholarship and legacy (1914-1999) transcends well beyond the
borders of India as he is highly regarded even in the Arab world. Abul Hassan was born in prepartition Indian in the region of Uttar Pradesh in 1914, and followed his father's footsteps by
attaining an Islamic education in Quranic recitation, Islamic sciences, and the languages of
Arabic, Urdu, and Farsi. Most importantly he served as the rector of Nadwat al-Ulama and
fiercely opposed the concept of Pan-Arab nationalism.115 Concerns regarding the future of Islam
amid Pan-Arabic aspirations led him to author a paper which later turned into a thesis titled,
“The Attitude of World of Islam towards Western Civilization”116 While translating this work
into Urdu, he made revisions to the thesis, add new information, and published them in 2003,
titled Muslim Mumalik mein Islamiyyat aur Maghribiyat ki Kashmakash (The Clash between
Islamic Tradition and Modernity in Muslim Countries).117
What compelled Abul Hasan to write Muslim Mumamlik was a sense of urgency created
by the moral degeneracy of Muslim countries, their political and military weaknesses, as well as
the pervasiveness of Western culture and its ideas, and influence in the Muslim world. Abul
Hasan described the current situation of modern Muslims as, “all Muslim countries today are
grappling with an acute crisis of an ideological and intellectual nature. This crises more
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adequately can be summarized as a clash or battle [of subjectivities] between Islam and the
West.”118 Thus he historicized how this crisis between the West and the Muslim world began,
how it transformed Muslim subjects, and what the future status of Islam looked like. Abu
Hassan’s book very clearly supports my hypothesis that some South Asian thinkers, who were
deeply critical of the Western project of modernity, and this disdain for the West becomes
manifest in Abul Hassan’s reception of al-Islam.
In section “Proponents of Western civilization from the Arab world,” Abul Hasan first
described how several aspiring and rising intellectuals from the Egyptian world, travelled to
Europe, to “swim in their waters” meaning to be inculcated in the Western mode of subjectivity,
skepticism, and rationalism. These same men were trained to demand hard evidence and proofs,
and were taught to be suspicious of universalizing claims, according to Abul Hassan.
Furthermore, they were trained to demand human rights, liberty, and freedom from oppressive
powers, such as that of “religion,” and were encouraged to rebel against the system of Islam.119
In Abul Hassan’s view, the only two Muslim intellectuals who sucessfully resisted the West’s
coercive and transformative powers were; the Pakistani Poet-Philosopher, Muhammad Iqbal
(1877-1938) and Indian activist, Muhammad Ali (1878-1931). These men, served as an example
for what lacked within the Egyptian and Arab Muslims, namely the need for more “lovers of
Islam.” In his opinion, men like Iqbal and Ali had used Western knowledge to criticize this same
system, rather than their din.120
As a continuation of these thoughts in another section titled “Egyptian Orientalists and
their echoes” Abul Hasan mentioned specific Egyptian thinkers who had been fully molded by
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Western values, to the extent that they even “breathed from the lungs of the West,” meaning that
any trace of Islamic sensibilities within them had been eradicated internally.121 The ultimate task
of such Muslims was to please the West, to spread its agenda, to demolish the foundations of
Islam and to further the process of secularization, Abul Hasan contended. Among such Egyptian
Orientalists (Mustashriqueen), he mentioned Ali Abd al-Raziq’s name, as an advocate for the
separation of Islam and politics. He further added, “The extent of Western power was so strong
that it had made a religious scholar (Alim) spread Orientalists ideas that the Caliphate was not
related to nor relevant in Islam.”122
Abul Hassan vociferously attacked Abd al-Raziq as an advocate of the West for claiming
that the Caliphate was only a necessity for a specific period, and had eventually transformed
from Kingship into dynastic rulership. What stung Abul Hassan the most, was the overall
message of Abd al-Raziq's work that the Caliphate had no relationship with Sharia which
allowed Muslims to select any other form of government befitting the needs of their times.123 For
Abul Hassan, Abd al-Raziq's inspiration could safely be attributed to the West and its project of
modernity. I partially agree with the Indian Alim that the diffusion of Western power through its
project of modernity had affected the minds and bodies of Muslims as thoroughly as it had their
institutions of learning, spaces of discipline, spheres of law, and spheres of domesticity.
However, I do not agree with Abul Hasan’s claim that thinkers like Muhammad Iqbal had
successfully “resisted” this power, or that Abd al-Raziq was advocating on behalf of Orientalists.
Conscription for the project of modernity was an all-encompassing and non-voluntary
project. Therefore I cannot imagine how Iqbal could have resisted this project, given that he
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received most of his higher education in Europe and was thoroughly inspired by European
intellectuals such as Sir Thomas Arnold, Nietzsche, and Kant, to name just a few. Even a shallow
reading of Iqbal's Reconstruction of Religious Thought proves the fact that the Pakistani
philosopher drew on the works of several Western philosophers. On the concept of immortality,
for instance, Iqbal mentioned “There is, however, in the history of modern thought one positive
view of immortality– I mean Nietzsche's doctrine of Eternal Recurrence. This view deserves
some consideration, not only because Nietzsche has maintained it with a prophetical fervor, but
also because it reveals a real tendency in the modern mind."124
While it is true that the Western models of education, instruction, and training, also
impacted how Abd al-Raziq came to regard the Islamic tradition and history, we should not
overlook his commitment to the system of Sharia. Abd al-Raziq repeatedly affirmed his
commitmment by stating, “Are we not commanded by the Sharī’a to be generous to beggars,
considerate to the poor, and kind and compassionate towards them? Would a reasonable man
deduce from this that we should make it a point to have poor people and beggars in our
midst?”125 He used this analogy to argue that even if authentic Prophetic Hadith encouraged
obedience to the Caliphate, it did not mean that Muslims should treat this political institution as
one of God’s commandments as required by Sharia. He further deduced, “To treat the Caliphate
as a requirement of “religious” law (Sharia) is a proposition that has consequences of great
magnitude.” By this, he meant that the Caliphate concept had been retroactively elevated and
given a quasi-divine status, while it had been a human-made, political, and corrupting institution.
Therefore, even though both Iqbal and Abd al-Raziq were conscripts and particpiated within the
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project of modernity, this did not lessen their commitment to Islam nor their concern for the
future of the Ummah.

*****
Lastly, I want to discuss Muhammad Raziul Islam’s review of al-Islam and the evidence
he brings forth in favor of the historic Caliphate. Raziul Islam's last name makes it apparent that
he too is formally associated with the Nadwat al-Ualam's institution. Born in 1964 India, he
currently serves as the secretary of Tasneefi Academy, and as a member of the Jamaat-e-Islam
political party, (Hind) India branch. Aside from this information, little is available online
regarding his formal education, mentors, or how he became interested in Abd al-Raziq’s work.
All we know is that Raziul Islam dedicated one blog post on his website to al-Islam titled “Islami
Nizami Hukumat pe kiye jaane wale Aaterazaat” or “Some objections on the Islamic system of
government and rule.”126
Unlike other reviewers mentioned in this section, Raziul Islam first outlines what kind of
rulership and form of governance are commanded by both Allah and His messenger. Using
Quran's chapter 4 (Surah An-Nisa) verse 59, he quotes, “O you who have believed, obey Allah
and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you… that is the best [way] and best in the
result.”127 For Raziul Islam “those in authority” refers to a Caliph who not only ensures the
protection and physical well being of the Ummah but also of their spiritual and moral
astuteness.128 The alim then mentions the hadith from Sahih Muslim regarding obedience to a
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leader that, “ ”ان ا ّم ّر علیکم عبد مجدّع یقودکم بکتاب ہللا فاسمعوا و اطیعواmeaning “even if an Ethiopian
slave is appointed over you, as long as he obeys the book of Allah, then you must follow and
obey him.”129 Therefore using these pieces of evidence from the Quran and Hadith, Raziul Islam
establishes that in Islam there has never been nor can there ever be, a separation between
political power and “religious” guidance.
Preceding from this point Raziul Islam also mentions how in European history, the
separation of Church and State emerged from specific instances of religious wars, abuse of papal
authority and corruption, as well as disagreements amongst Christians over doctrinal issues.
Hence, the Catholic church was stripped of its political power and religion was declared a private
matter, Raziul Islam informs his readers.130 Here we also find Raziul Islam's implicit critique that
the specific circumstances in the history of the West led to the demotion of Christianity and
triumph of the political doctrine of Secularism. This result was then encouraged in the Muslim
world by a few Muslim thinkers, in his opinion, who claimed that Islam too had this separation
of spheres. I suspect Raziul Islam is categorizing Abd al-Raziq within such Muslim thinkers, and
accusing him of claiming that Islam has not elaborated on any political ethics of governance,
which blatantly misconstrues Abd al-Raziq's work. Another error on Raziul Islam’s part, is to
state that “Abd al-Raziq completed his higher education at Oxford” while we know that he had
only briefly enrolled in a course at the university.
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While Raziul Islam does not make scathing remarks against al-Islam or Abd al-Raziq,
like his colleague, Abul Hassan, Raziul Islam also manages to misrepresent a lot of Abd alRaziq’s points including, that “Islam has allowed Muslims to run all their affairs freely based on
their rationality, experiences of their nations, and the nature of politics of their conditions.”131
Whereas in his work what Abd al-Raziq wrote was, “It (political governance) is a matter which
religion (Islam) has left to humankind, for people to organize themselves following the principles
of reason, the experience of nations and the rules of politics.”132 Meaning that Islam has not
specified nor limited Muslims in their possibilities or imaginations from creating a different form
of political organization which could still uphold the precepts of Sharia, the commandments of
Allah, and the example of Prophet Muhammad, all the while participating in the conditions of
modernity.

*****
To conclude, I have presented the reactions, receptions, and responses of some South
Asian Muslims to Abd al-Raziq’s book al-Islam. By focusing on opinions and critiques of Indian
and Pakistani Muslims, I have shown how their response to Abd al-Raziq's al-Islam is to take the
opposite position in support of the Caliphate and its “religious” significance in Islam. Their
reaction was more or less generated by the specific historical conditions in South Asian including
the demise of the Khilafat movement, the nature of educational reforms in Mudaras, and the
creation of Pakistan, rather than simply an opposition to the historical evidence of Abd al-Raziq's
basic argument. By strongly admonishing Abd al-Raziq's work, South Asian Muslims were
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directly projecting their critique of Western modernity, as having played a crucial part in the
formation of Abd al-Raziq's specific arguments.
I hope that by putting individual Indian and Pakistani thinkers in conversation with Abd
al-Raziq and his work, we can view these connections between the Middle East and South Asia
not as ‘freeze-framed’ moments within history. But rather as reoccurring within different
temporalities, as constituted by the relationship between the space of experience and the horizon
of expectation, and in the context of language and history, language and time, and language and
experience.133 All of these voices allow us to trace cross-cultural connections between South
Asia and the Middle East, and India and Egypt. Furthermore, incorporating these voices, I
believe, reinvigorates the debate surrounding the definition and memory of the Caliphate—a
debate which triggers disagreements on the nature of political sovereignty and its relationship to
“religious” authority—to the present day.

*****
V. Conclusion
This thesis began with curiosity regarding Abd al-Raziq's bold claim that the Caliphate
was a purely political institution, which had retroactively been made a part of the faith. Before
embarking upon this project, I, like several of Abd al-Raziq's other critics, was skeptical and
ready to dismiss his claims as an Orientalist inspired hubris. However, after spending close to
two years researching, revising, and reformulating several of my assumptions, I have come to
agree with Abd al-Raziq on several points. I am now convinced that the importance assigned to
the Caliphate institution by modern Muslims is due to a longing for a past which has long gone.
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A past in which modern Muslims imagine the conditions to be perfect, where the first Ummah’s
unity was unbreakable, and the status of Islam was a force to be reckoned with.
As Muqtedar Khan, has convincingly explained, “One of the enduring myths of Islamic
beliefs is the ultimate glorification of early Muslims…early Muslims are far superior in intellect
and virtue than later Muslims.”134 The only way out of this mindset set is to realize that the
modern Ummah is just as unique, as the Rashidun’s, since modern Muslims have been entrusted
with guiding each other without the aid of Prophet Muhammad. This is precisely what I believe
Abd al-Raziq was also encouraging in al-Islam. Instead of trying to capture the past in the form
of the Caliphate, modern Muslims should embrace what their present conditions have made
available, namely an opportunity to create an experiment in politics, just as long as this
experiment adheres to the system of Sharia, the word of God, and the example of the Prophet.
My thesis has shown that instead of demonizing, dismissing, or banishing the ideas of
Abd al-Raziq as “un-Islamic” or “scandalous”, we should grapple with them, even when we
disagree with some or most of his work. Most importantly, my work has argued that instead of
relying upon rigid categories of “Liberal,” “Secular,” and “Laicist,” we should keep in mind Abd
al-Raziq's commitment to Islam, his use of Quranic verses and Prophetic hadith to support his
arguments, and his project of reform as taking place within the bounds of Islamic tradition.
While it can be said that Abd al-Raziq was advocating for the creation of a secular state, he most
certainly was not advocating for the complete secularization of the Egyptian society, nor the
Muslim world.
Despite enduring grave consequences for his ideas, Abd al-Raziq did not renounce his
opinions regarding the Caliphate. As he made quite clear in his Introduction, his book was meant
134
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to serve as a starting point for debate on the nature of political authority and sovereignty,
“religious” legitimacy, the idealization of the Islamic past-- especially of the Rashidun-- and the
nature of Prophet Muhammad’s leadership. All of these points meant to serve as the beginning of
a discussion, rather than a final word on the matter. Abd al-Raziq presented his case and
anticipated that Muslims no doubt would disagree with him. As David Scott has written in his
book Conscripts of Modernity, “There remains another story… the story of transformations that
have reshaped those conditions which are not of people’s choosing but within which they must
make their history.”135 This is precisely what Abd al-Raziq was attempting within the historical
conditions available to him, by asking, what if modern Muslims moved past the notion of the
Caliphate--especially the one which has been constructed as a quasi-divinely ordained form of
government? What other paths and horizons of expectations present themselves to the modern
Ummah?
Furthermore, he posited particular dilemmas which remain unresolved within modern
Islamic political thought, namely; How can believers adhere to the precepts of the Sharia which
was meant to address all aspects of Muslims’ lives, when the modern state takes over this
system, curtails its powers, and banishes it to the “private” sphere? Second, when a modern
nation-state also redefines the meanings of the terms “religious” and political authority, how then
can Muslims reconcile these redefinitions with what had existed previously within Islamic
history? Moreover, how can Muslims live in a moral community they define as the “Ummah”
while still being citizens of a nation-state?
By detailing specific points within Abd al-Raziq’s book, the reception of categorization
of his work in both Western and non-Western scholarship, as well as South Asian Muslims’
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critique of al-Islam and the greater project of modernity, it is hoped that the readers will
appreciate a new perspective on Abd al-Raziq’s scholarly contributions. Given the constraints of
space, I was not able to discuss in depth the affinities in political thoughts possibly present
between the Pakistani Poet-Philosopher, Muhammad Iqbal’s and Abd al-Raziq. While I cannot
substantiate that historically, Iqbal and Abd al-Raziq ever communicated, met, or came across
each other’s work, I believe both thinkers’ ideas overlapped, especially with regards to the
Caliphate. This is a thread of inquiry I would like to follow in a future project, by emphasizing
that Abd al-Raziq was not alone in his journey of reconfiguring the definition of the Caliphate in
Islam. Additionally, that scholarship on modern Islamic political thought should emphasize
cross-cultural connections, rather than the study of thinkers and their ideas in sealed and isolated
vacuums.
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